MANIPULATING THE DETERMINATION OF REALITY—A Treatise on Meta-Technology

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This outline lists existing manuscripts which serve as sources for the treatise. "From Fundamental Philosophy to Meta-Technology" is cited so many times that I abbreviate the title FPMT. * means that a manuscript has already been published.

PHASE I. BACKGROUND (papers which do not need to be rewritten or published in the core treatise)

A. The "Is there language?" trap and other "nihilative" philosophy
   1a. The Flaws Underlying Beliefs *
   1b. Primary Study (1964) *
   1c. Primary Study: Informal Paraphrase (1966/79)
   2. Is Incredulity Self-Defeating? (1977/80)
   3. Philosophical Reflections I *
   4. revised Philosophical Impertinances as Philosophical Reflections II?
   5. FPMT I

B. New intellectual modalities
   These manuscripts can be approached in two ways. They are instances of intellectual modalities which ignore cognition—activities which follow directly from the rejection of truth as an intellectual goal. They are also parables of the meta-technology. But as such they must be "translated" into literal meta-technological procedures—a task which requires profound understanding of elementary meta-technological procedures and also of the prevailing scientific belief-system and its "fault-lines."

   1. Representation of the Memory of an Energy Cube Organism * (This is a parable of e.g. an instrumental procedure which utilizes moods such as stupor, euphoria, vertigo, anxiety, etc. in an overall situation in which the Self can choose its factual world by choosing the order in which it recalls the totality of facts which define the world. A translation into literal procedures might refer to a physics in which the weight of a collection of particles depends on the order in which the particles are noticed.)
   2. Concept Art *
   3. 1966 Mathematical Studies * (one translation of Energy Cube Organism and Concept Art)
   4. Perception-Dissociator Model * (one translation of this is The Perception-Dissociation of Physics *)
   5. Mock Risk Games *

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PHASE I (continued)

C. Early vague proposals for a technology which manipulates or plasticizes reality/cognition rather than ignoring it
   1. Philosophical Aspects of Walking Through Walls *
   2. Proposal for a Geniuses' Liberation Project *
   3. Superseding the Life-World
   4. FPMT II; IIIA

D. Political consequences (of plasticizing reality)
   1. Proposal for a Geniuses' Liberation Project *
   2. The Crisis in Physics pp. 27-8 (naive because it poses the alternatives as political revolutionary struggle or dropping out)
   3. FPMT, IIIB, C; IV (correctly recognizes that the only alternative is a "war" over the determination of reality)
   4. The Theory of Ordinary People
      (The ordinary person who is profoundly deferential toward conventional success is profoundly arrogant relative to the tidings of the meta-technology. In this respect arrogance or heedlessness is the principal trait of the ordinary person. Demoralization-depravity and loyalty to the status quo are complementary qualities. Demolition of the spirit results in loyalty to the status-quo mythology of reality, not a superior challenge to that mythology.)

PHASE II. THE CORE TREATISE

A. Previous overviews of the meta-technology
   1. The Crisis in Physics pp. 26-30
   2. Anti-Mathematics pp. 2-3
   3. FPMT II, IIIA; Appendix

B. The logic of contradictions
   1. new General Introduction (the logic of contradictions as a family of related investigations; repudiation of mathematical logic and littérature dialectics)
      cf. Problematic Junctures pp. 16-17
   2. The Bankruptcy of Logic and the Problem of Codifying "Real-World" Logic
      (object-lesson in the real-world logic of consistency; relation between language and habituated perceptual routines which makes logical impossibilities "picturable")
   3. Preview of the Logic of Contradictions (inventory of logical impossibilities at the experiential level)
   4. "Inescapable" propositional inconsistencies: the natural language and common sense
      a. The Logic of Contradictions and the Common-Sense Reality (re-edited 12/78)
      b. The Paradoxes of Common Sense
      c. Paradigm 1 (paradigm of substantive reasoning with admissible common-sense contradictions)
PHASE II (continued)

B. 5. Anti-Mathematics
(Preface; Naiveté and the Critique of Mathematics
Co-optation of "Failure Theorems" as the Sustaining Strategy of Mathematics
Overview of the Trans-mathematical Critique of Mathematics
Argument That the Metatheory of Arithmetic and of Set Theory Is Inconsistent
Failure Theorems at the Research Frontier
Appendix: List of Established Failure Theorems
Problematic Junctures in the Quantification of Nature)

6. Further investigations?
   a. Calculus of the consequence-relationship for contradictory world-states?
   b. Absorbing contradictions (the "reality-plasticizing" analogue of converting contradictions into "consistent" new subject-matter or constructing models for inconsistent theories)
   c. "Translations" from Energy Cube Organism and 1966 Mathematical Studies

7. new Varieties of Dialectics
(Contradiction as "unfolding"—in a metaphysics which identifies the determination of concepts with the determination of "the world." The aim here is to recover the radical logic in the Hegelian tradition, express it as a method, and to compare it with my approach which places much more emphasis on uncanny perceptions, experiential discomposition of the world, and the experiential realization of logically impossible world-states such as being in New York and at Arcturus simultaneously. Incidentally, objectives such as the latter may require cross-potentiation of meta-technological procedures and scientific technology in some advanced way which I cannot foresee.)
   a. A Constructive Explication of Hegel
   b. A Schematized Summary of Adorno's Dialectical Logic
   c. The Next Conservative Orthodoxy in Philosophy

C. A priori neurocybernetics
1. Scientific Speculations on the Study of Consciousness: A Review
2. Subjective Propositional Vibration *
3. new Intersensory Discorrelation (translation of The Perception-Dissociation of Physics)
4. new Determination of an Objectivity by Reciprocal Subjectivity
5. Cybernetics of Controlled Brain Inputs?

D. Evaluational processing of experience
1. Proposal for a Geniuses' Liberation Project *
2. Superseding the Life-World
3. The dream project
   a. Memo on the Dream Project *
   b. Dreams and Reality *
   c. Flying Dreams *
PHASE II (continued)

E. Cross-potentiation

SPV in contradictory world-states?
translation of Energy Cube Organism
translation of 1966 Mathematical Studies

F. Illuminatory Media Environments

1. HESE Logic 1/4/1979
2. unrealized score for Hallucinogenic Sound Environment, 4/1977

PHASE III. SUPPORTING HARDWARE FOR META-TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH

While most of this hardware is scientifically manufactured, its use is to be totally directed by the new purposes. I am in no way seeking to practice normal science without a license. The meta-technological facilities will not duplicate science-controlled research. Examples of my relation to normal science are my citations of scientific research on perception in Intersensory Discorrelation and my citations of mathematical subject-matter in Anti-Mathematics (e.g. the algorithm for mathematical revolutions formulates an operation on normal mathematics which normal mathematics cannot itself formulate). Then, Hennix's "Electric Harpsicord I" starts with existing musical devices—so that it starts from the belief-system of musical structure and audio engineering—and it yields an audio program which, if heard "with understanding," will cause you to dismiss the belief-system of musical structure and audio engineering as inferior. "EHI" and other ISEs in no way duplicate the "computer music" supported by Bell Labs etc. Indeed, ISEs seek to destroy the climate which allows institutions such as Bell Labs to exist. If the reader objects that he cannot tell the difference, I can only say that the difference is absolutely sharp to us and would also be to the administrators of Bell Labs.

A. Custom computer design and manufacturing facility
B. Perceptual psychology facilities
C. Neurophysiology facilities (inter-brain linkages?—brain-computer linkages?)
D. Psychotropic drugs
E. Media (audio, light, animation, etc.) with possibility of computer control

(re physical experimentation on human subjects: I reject the scientific proposals for such research, which are supported by the Pentagon, the CIA, NATO, etc. Essentially these proposals study people by impairing them; they aim to create more efficient pawns to carry out the purposes of power politics. The political masters do not want the experiments performed on themselves; and they are confident that the physical modifications will not lead the subjects to rebel against the masters' goals. The combination of these two circumstances makes it certain that the experiments make the subjects worse off. I advocate only experimentation which has effects antithetical to what I have just described.)
MANIPULATING THE DETERMINATION OF REALITY:  
A Priori Neurocybernetics:  
Problems of Subjective Immediate Phenomena

Henry Flynt  
(July 1980)

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0. Introduction

In the course of investigating the determination of an objectivity by reciprocal subjectivities, I made a careful analysis of observable phenomena relative to the workings of the natural language as it is used to describe such phenomena. But my inventory of observable phenomena was highly biased, because it took as its norm the most banal of object-gestalts, such as a table or a rock which I see in front of me. There was a good reason for my decision to give priority to these lifeless, banal objects of perception. I wanted to show that even at the most stable, banal level, the conventionally assumed relationships among (1) what one sees, (2) established linguistic expressions, and (3) one's membership in a community can be discomposed—i.e. that the relationships can become uncanny and break up. This analysis was satisfactory and useful as far as it went. But it did not go far enough. It underemphasized entire types of "observable" or immediate phenomena which are not thing-like. The attention given to "singular experience" (a catch-phrase for illusions, afterimages, mirages, dreams, hallucinations, etc.) was insufficient. It is necessary to make an inventory of those immediate phenomena which are least thing-like and most "singular"—especially the "personalistic subjectivities" such as mood, involvement, willfulness, and morale.

Also, if one wants to show that the thinghood and stability and banality of the objects we perceive can be dissolved at the level of perception, then one promising procedure for doing so is to call attention to the "personalistic subjectivities" which are co-present with the stable, banal things in one's "encounter of" them. (E.g. a table does not enter my environs as an isolate; it is always alongside my mood, my attentiveness or indifference, my willfulness or passivity, my morale.) We have been indoctrinated to comport ourselves to a table, and to a mood (or morale), as phenomena separable and autonomous from one another. But the question now is as follows. Will something uncanny happen to the table if we search out and potentiate junctures at which the autonomy of the table from one's mood and attentiveness and morale is broken down? A crucial proviso must be included here. Meta-technology is always an instrumental modality. To answer my question with the sort of "poetry" or "philosophy" which merely pastes together my emotion and a table, as if my emotion were a mere private reaction, an interpretation, is not enough.
The answer will not be satisfactory unless it finds instrumentally effective connections between morale and the reality of things (and such connections cannot be mere paste jobs). In Nightfrost in Prague (Karz Publishers, 1980), Z. Mlynar says that in the moment of crisis in his life's commitment to Soviet Communism, in which he was in mortal danger from his Russian "older brothers" and at the same time was required to play the part of a statesman negotiating with other statesmen, his "head was swarming, not with thoughts, but rather with images and sensations, endless, illogical films or something like visions." That's more like it. This isn't a case of poetically pasting emotional reactions onto tables; the tables get lost. But Mlynar's experience ended as kitsch, because he had an easy way out of the uncanniness: he escaped to the West and went to work as a bourgeois functionary. He therefore confined his crisis to a cliche political defection and exchange of masters. What I want is a way into a juncture in which the occlusion of the stable objects in one's field of awareness cannot be counteracted by escaping from one middle management job to another, as it were. The way into such a juncture also should not depend on brutalization, on being kidnapped by political thugs. When we have found the desired state of consciousness, I predict that it will be impossible to experimentally establish laws of physics within it. It will in this sense be trans-scientific.

1. Inventory of Types of Subjective Immediate Phenomena

In this inquiry, I am concerned solely with phenomena which the prevailing world-view classifies as subjective. Forget about atoms and molecules and cosmic rays, and eternal laws of arithmetic and geometry, and chromosomes, and the wiring diagrams of the brain, and the business cycle, and the Peloponnesian War, and the pyramids of Egypt when I am not observing them. Next, I am concerned with those phenomena which are classified as proximate, immediate, or present. Let me elaborate on this important qualification. I am focusing on phenomena which have the character of immediate experience and which lie within the immediate. The majority of human activities which can be conceived in the prevailing culture are oriented towards goals which lie beyond the immediate. One goes to work today to earn a wage paid next week; refrains from embezzling today because of fear of being caught in next year's audit; prays to God today to go to Heaven when one dies; learns quantum mechanics; compiles telephone directories; produces nuclear missiles which will be retired without ever being used; makes a will; avenges today an injury done many years ago. But I am about to present a raw inventory of subjective immediate phenomena; and activities oriented beyond the immediate will be deliberately underrepresented. I do not suggest, however, that the raw inventory will be exactly confined to experiences which are immediate and completed within the immediate. Some of the most important immediate subjectivities may be entangled with non-immediates, specifically, with the "imputation of contexts of objectivity" as defined in "Determination of an Objectivity by Reciprocal Subjectivity." In those cases, I want to include them, and to postpone the question of the extent to which they are entangled with imputed objectivities. I will then settle the latter issue in a subsequent analysis.
It is amazing how many different types of subjective immediate phenomena can be distinguished. I should mention that some of the types I will specify no doubt overlap with each other, but that is all right. Perfect disjunctions are not necessary in a raw inventory. Then, the phenomena which I classify as being of different types certainly are not claimed to occur in isolation within experience, i.e. to be mutually exclusive immediates. Quite the contrary. Certain of these types of phenomena must appear co-presently—alongside one another. A visual-table-experience must be co-present with presence-of-mind and hardness and attentiveness: if the latter requirements are not satisfied, as when one is acutely fevered, then one will not be able to "focus" a table and the table will "get lost."

**raw inventory of types of subjective immediate phenomena**

- a visual-table-experience
- a tactile-table/surface-experience
- sounds
- smells
- a visual-waterfall-experience
- an aural-siren-experience
- listening to music
- disembodied light (beam, glare, rainbow, aureole, gegenschein)
- blinking light
- visual afterimage
- the waterfall illusion
- flashes of light produced by pressure on the eyes
- "seeing spots"
- mirages
- "the air is twinkling" (visual singular experience—hallucinatory)
- blurred vision—removal of eyeglasses
- ringing in the ears
- synesthesia: e.g. a sharp pitch in music is brighter or more tense
- "discarding" a visual object by turning one's head
- "discarding" non-mental visuality by closing one's eyes
- waving one's hand in front of one's eyes
- looking at the sun with eyes closed and waving the spread fingers of both hands in one's line of sight
- looking at pinpoint bright lights in darkness with one's eyelids almost closed
- sense of muscle tone
- stuttering
- twitching of the body
- crying
- coordination or incoordination
- drowsiness
- fatigue
- psycho/somatic sexual feeling
- taste
- temperature (assessment of environmental temperature vs. body temperature)
- tactile texture
- hunger
sweating
itching
headache
nausea
pain
breathing
heartbeat
pulse
chewing
swallowing
elimination
sneezing
coughing
vomiting
tactile assessment of shape
watching while I place a right-hand finger between the tips of crossed
left-hand fingers
touching the floor with a long stick and feeling the floor in the stick
talking out loud
willfully evoked mental visual imagings (eyes closed)
mental visual imagings "flowing quasi-autonomously"
mental aural "imagings" brought to prominence by willfully ignoring ambient
non-mental sound
the creative act of attention by which "music in one's head" and ambient sound
are combined
"mentally undressing" a (non-mental visual) person
stopping one's ears in a quiet room and listening to the "inner sounds"
willful thought as mental verbalization
name-recognition of perceptions
name-assignment to entities
logical judgment of perception
enumerating an assemblage of visual or tactile objects or sounds
mentally dividing a non-mental visual surface
remembered voices speaking or flowing quasi-autonomously in one's mind
mental numerical calculations
daydreams evoked willfully
voluntary memories
involuntary memories
déjà vu
involuntary daydreams (visions?)
dreaming
hypnagogic hallucination
presence-of-mind vs. "not being all here"
alertness
hardiness
debilitation
dizziness
"the room is swimming" visually
fevered hallucination
liking
annoyance
fear
hostility
regret
shame
"his face is scary" (sight and emotion fused)
relish
malaise
sadness
joy
complacency
serenity
tension
agitation
restlessness
boredom
fidgeting
love (as a present emotion or mood)
clinical regression
attentiveness
disregard
involvement
indifference
willfulness
passivity
involuntariness
longing (especially longing to escape physical discomfort)
self-consciousness
awareness of awareness
skeptical detachment: deliberate suspension of belief
"projecting": daydreaming as planning my next action (co-present with willfulness)
"choice": willfully embarking on my next action as one of several fantasized alternatives
"morale": most generally, feelings about whether my condition and the next actions possible for me are worthwhile
dance
exercise
musical performance
boxing
play
performance of a chore
work
self-image: self-satisfaction; self-pity; self-loathing
taking oneself seriously
self-irony
clinical depersonalization
"surfacing of the subconscious": thoughts and feelings in dreams, hallucinations, etc. which contain inflammatory or embarrassing insight or self-revelation
nimbus-experience: something splendid is seen to be enveloped by cloudy luminescence
2. Dichotomies in Subjective Phenomena; Personalistic Subjectivities

Having presented a raw inventory of subjective immediate phenomena, I can infer certain contrasts or dichotomies in these phenomena. However, the purpose of mentioning these contrasts is not at all to claim that they are inviolable—that there are no phenomena overlapping the dichotomies. Rather, the purpose of mentioning the dichotomies is to focus attention on aspects of subjective immediate phenomena which we have been indoctrinated to overlook. Awareness of the dichotomies is a necessary preparation for seeking out phenomena which break through the dichotomies or which are located at the interfaces of dichotomies.

Non-mental experience is distinguished from mental experience. It would be worthwhile to investigate the cues that identify a particular phenomenon as mental rather than non-mental. (E.g. sights are felt to be mental partly if they occur while the eyes are felt to be closed.)

Then, "exterior" phenomena have differing degrees of exteriority and thing-hood. Gestalts of thing-hood are primarily dependent on sight and secondarily on touch. Disembodied light is entirely exterior and extended in space, but is not thing-like or corporeal. The zone of vision and hearing "between object-gestalts and the mind" (afterimages, seeing spots, ringing in the ears) is the least "exterior" non-mental visual (or aural) zone.

Somatic sensations are interior but non-mental. Certain symptoms of disorientation and illness are most difficult to label as exterior or interior: not being all here, vertigo.

With reference to non-mental phenomena, we encounter stasis or stability, and we also encounter change or motion (as when I watch a waterfall). This point is important, because Spengler claimed that temporality was not a quality of the exterior-perceptual world. If palpable change is temporal, then his thesis does not make sense to me. Our perceptions of a waterfall, a windmill, a siren, a massage "manifest temporality" to as great a degree as any proximate subjectivities can do so. (If by temporality he meant historicity, then he was talking about something whose meaning cannot lie within proximate subjectivity.)

With reference to mental activity, it can be willful, or it can flow quasi-autonomously or be involuntary.

Experiential memories have, as perceptions, the character of daydreams; but we sharply distinguish memories from daydreams. What are the cues by which we make this distinction?

The above dichotomies are worth exploring, but the most significant dichotomy lies along a different axis. Within the realm of subjective immediate phenomena, we can distinguish some phenomena as being more "personalistic" than others, more "ownmost," more "selfmost." A visual-table-experience, watching a waterfall, seeing spots, the counting of non-mental objects, making mental numerical calculations, the purely mental visualization of a table—all these phenomena are relatively "impersonalistic," even though they are utterly my own in some other sense (nobody else sees the table on my behalf, sees the table I see). On the other hand, regret, satisfaction, relish,
malaise, serenity, boredom, attentiveness, involvement, willfulness, longing, awareness of awareness, choice, self-image, and morale are relatively "personalistic." I am not the one who originally posited the dichotomy of impersonalistic and personalistic, and I have no stake in claiming that the dichotomy is exact and inviolable. Indeed, I want to violate the dichotomy, to find junctures at which personalistic subjectivities break into the impersonalistic sphere and interact with it. But we cannot search for these junctures unless we posit the dichotomy, thereby directing ourselves to aspects of proximate subjectivity which we have been conditioned to overlook. It is only after we have posited the contrast that we can fully appreciate the way in which, for example, nimbus-experience fuses cloudy light (and usually speech or music) with splendor and enlightenment, and thereby transcends the dichotomy.

The personalistic subjectivities evidently are a potential nemesis of the scientific world-view: that is why we, in this civilization, have been so ruthlessly conditioned to overlook them—at least when reality and cognition are at issue. But the power of personalistic subjectivities to nullify the scientific standpoint will not be realized without a long quest. Individual lack of interest in mathematics or physics is a personalistic subjectivity; but this personalistic subjectivity certainly has not lessened the hegemony of mathematics and physics in the culture. Women as a group have disdained mathematics; but the result has been a lessening of the authority of women, not of mathematics. Personalistic subjectivities will have to be amplified, remolded, potentiated before they will have the impact of e.g. my intellectual attack on mathematics in Anti-Mathematics. In particular, we must, through analysis, disentangle the imputed contexts of objectivity in personalistic subjectivities before we can ascertain how the personalistic subjectivities should be potentiated. (This task of analysis would not even be proposed by a thinker who was not a "nihilative empiricist." ) I undertake this task in the next section.

Spengler can be interpreted as having posited the dichotomy of impersonalistic and personalistic subjectivities. He connected that dichotomy to other large ontological dichotomies. (Actually, it might be more accurate to say that Spengler blurred the immediate and subjective with the non-immediate and objective. Thus, his distinctions are more nearly instantiations of the dichotomy of nature and history.) The impersonalistic sphere is linked to completedness, space, extension, lifelessness, and mathematics. The personalistic sphere is linked to becoming, time, irreversibility (directedness), living, and destiny. But, as I have already intimated, there is no interpretation of these contrasts which fully makes sense to me. If we are concerned with immediate subjectivities, then we definitely have impersonalistic perceptions of change and motion. These perceptions manifest temporality to as great a degree as any immediate subjectivities can. Also, the temporality of the sight of a waterfall cannot be equated with time as a quantified spatial dimension, the spatialized time which Bergson accused physics of fabricating.
Part of the mystery may arise because Spengler was blurring together momentary anticipation and ten thousand years of historicity as the same temporality, was blurring together a perception of a table and astronomical contemplation of the entire universe of galaxies as space-perception, and was blurring together the present instant and the eternal present of astrophysical contemplation of galactic evolution as atemporality. In any case, if the temporality and irreversibility which Spengler said were uniquely personalistic are meant to be matters of history and destiny, the schema still does not make sense to me. I hardly need to repeat that history and destiny are not subjective immediates. (And rather than agreeing that they are inherent in the human condition, I would rather say that they are inherent in the human illusion: cf. the next section.) I am, however, willing to entertain historical and societal notions at a certain stage, because I am committed to a multi-stage perspective of intellectual revolution. Cf. "Can Depth Psychology Become a New Intellectual Modality?" and the notion of retroactive signification. But if a revolutionary outlook is going to entertain a notion of destiny relative to society and history—and if it is going to incorporate society and history in the "selfmostness" of the individual!—then it ought also to incorporate what modern Western civilization calls "the universe of nature," and extend the notion of destiny to it as well. Spengler proclaimed a poet's relativism in which every culture has its own myth of nature, but at the same time he could not help assuming that if you want an account of nature which is really true and really works, then modern Western science is the only option. "Every culture has its myth of nature; it is just that ours is the only one which will ever be true." In this outlook, the relativism exacerbates the limitation inherent in living in the middle of the scientific era. But what if the technology of the next civilization is one in which consciousness and personalism eclipse and suspend the lifeless expanse of galaxies—a technology so powerful that it can suspend nature and supersede the ontological isolation of nature by superseding thing-centered technology, which is what actually defines and sets apart nature as Spengler knew it? The emergence of a consciousness-directed, personalism-directed technology powerful enough to eclipse the universe of nature would have the character of qualitative novelty, or of influence from future to present. In that sense, destiny would overrun the universe of nature, and they could no longer be considered to be independent from one another.

Spengler also said that nature, the realm of space and extension, inherently lends itself to quantification and mathematics, whereas authentic time and personalism cannot be quantified. (There can be no mathematical equation for the core of the self.) But again, it seems to me that Spengler has made a distinction which only expresses his limitations and otherwise does not make sense. If one is prepared to make a critique of "contexts of objectivity," then even space and non-mental events cannot be quantified. But if one is prepared to blur immediacy and subjectivity with non-immediacy and objectivity, as Spengler did, they why not write equations for moods or volition or history? Spengler himself acknowledged that history is quantified by the dating of events. Today, American historians have a science called cliometrics. And why not? One hoax is as good as another. If the core of the self were more resistant to quantification than the operation of levers, it would be important to understand why. But again, I think the issue is just a special case of the dishonesty involved in positing a world beyond experience.
3. Critique: Disentangling Imputed Objectivities

My raw inventory of proximate subjectivities was made in terms of the conceptions of the prevailing world-view and its common sense. I sought to restrict the inventory to subjective experiences which lie within the immediate and are not oriented to goals lying beyond the immediate. But the prevailing conceptions themselves, and my acceptance of them, prevented me from ruling out all imputed contexts of objectivity in the subjective experiences I listed. I must now undertake a critique which only a nihilative empiricist would provide. I must disentangle the most important subjective immediate phenomena from all imputation of contexts of objectivity. That is, I must conceptually strip away the imputed objectivities from the experiences.

My reasons for wanting this critique are at the center of this investigation. As I said at the end of the preceding section, in certain discussions I am willing to entertain societal considerations, cultural considerations, historical considerations, and considerations of the world of nature. It is in the context of these considerations that activities like listening to music—and personalistic subjectivities like projecting, choice, morale, self-image, and surfacing of the subconscious—acquire their fullest traditional meanings. When such activities and personalisms are understood traditionally by recent Western philosophers who are unable to question the authority of natural science in its own sphere, then those philosophers may counterpose the sphere of science to the sphere of life, irreversibility, history, and choice or destiny. The counterposing of life and irreversibility to the world of science has been one of the traditions of resistance to total scientism in modern Western culture. But the relentless progress of scientific technology has steadily lessened the plausibility of this tradition of resistance. Scientists can in some sense change the world to make it more like their ideology says it is. Dilthey, Bergson, Spengler, Heidegger, Sartre were helpless in the face of this coercion of reality. (Marx is of course not in this company because he affirmed destiny and science as harmonious in the determination of reality—in dialectical materialism. Hegel and Marx both wanted to subsume science and history harmoniously in a dialectical determination of reality. A century later, with Lukács and Adorno, the dialecticians lost their affection for science, although they still could not challenge its authority intellectually.)

Before I make a critique of the personalistic subjectivities, I need to examine the traditional meanings of some of those subjectivities. I will introduce the critique with some unexpected considerations. Let us consider the reading of Anti-Mathematics as a "subjective immediate" activity. To learn that a purported system of absolute truth is actually a hoax induced by societal brainwashing is uncanny: mathematics begins to swim, or one's world-view begins to swim along a hitherto unknown axis. And such an experience is an extremely powerful counteragent to the authority of science—perhaps the most powerful one I have produced relative to the predilections of the university-educated Western middle class. The sheer power of Anti-Mathematics becomes a norm for every future attempt to shock people loose from the scientific standpoint. But to be caught up by Anti-Mathematics is not pure as an
immediate experience. Massive imputations of contexts of objectivity are involved in reading the work. As I have indicated repeatedly, projects like Anti-Mathematics are exercises in astute hypocracy, in which I connect with a hypothetical reader's assumptions (which are also in part my inherited assumptions) in order to sabotage them. Anti-Mathematics appeals to the reader's conformist indoctrination concerning mathematical truth and mathematical history in order to sabotage that indoctrination. But the entire exercise remains at the level of belief, of imputed contexts of objectivity; and the devolution that occurs lies exclusively in the realm of relative plausibilities (unless the reader can intuit the unspoken, wordless realization that it's all nonsense).

Indeed, to see the written word and spontaneously impute meaning to it is most definitely an experience with imputed objectivities—and no less so because the imputation of meaning is spontaneous. (And reading this manuscript is an experience with imputed objectivities; and the production of this manuscript is also an exercise in astute hypocracy.)

To be seized by Anti-Mathematics and have mathematics begin to swim is an experience which touches personalistic subjectivities, although the main aspect of the experience is intellectual. But let us turn to personalistic subjectivities as such, and to their traditional meanings. The emotion of regret presupposes a past, toward which it is directed. Apprehension presupposes a future and an objective danger (and on those very terms can be completely unwarranted and irrational). Shame usually presupposes a massive interdependency with one's neighbors in a structured community. Projecting and choice presuppose a future. They also presuppose that I can act, that I can produce change. And choice in particular has a further meaning: given that I can fantasize many materially exclusive courses of action, I have the power to realize my preference for one as opposed to the others. In its full elaboration, this notion becomes the transcendental dogma of freedom of the will, the dogma that the world's future is literally made by our whims. I will return to this notion later in the critique.

As for morale, in its societal-historical context it goes beyond feelings about whether my condition and the next actions possible for me are worthwhile. Traditionally, morale is the counterpoint between my "gut feelings" and the indoctrination, values, and roles foisted upon me jointly by my neighbors. My label for this is "society-directed morale."

Self-image, in the explicit context of biographical time, becomes the persistence of personal identity through time. In the explicit context of society and history, it becomes Ego-identity, my definition of myself in terms of ethnicity, class, socially recognized achievement, socially disapproved inadequacies and misdeeds, etc. Also, it is in the realm of morale and Ego-identity that taking oneself seriously and self-irony (as they are commonly understood) come to be at issue.

As for surfacing of the subconscious, it presupposes the hypothesis of the subconscious, a reasonable hypothesis in a naturalistic-rationalistic world-view; but a hypothesis which goes beyond the immediate to the personal past, the operation of memory, and the socialization of impulsive urges. Again, an extremely plausible inferential case can be made for the subconscious; but again, it is like apprehension and projecting and choice—one's comportment in these realms can be unwarranted and irrational even on the very terms which subtend these realms.
But I demand criticism, perhaps even denial, of these personalistic subjectivities. I do so for a series of linked reasons. In modern Western philosophy, the circumstance that we comport ourselves to contexts of objectivity even in immediate experience has repeatedly been cited to prove "the objective reality of the external world." To use my favorite illustration, it is like accepting prayer as proof of the existence of God: to do so, of course, is a howling non sequitur. Indeed, as I have already suggested repeatedly in this section, the circumstance that we comport ourselves to a context of objectivity does not make that comportment warranted or rational even in its own frame of reference. Philosophers harp on the circumstance that we fear the future; why don't they harp on the instances in which we subsequently disavowed our fears? They harp on the circumstance that we plan the future; why don't they harp on the instances in which we subsequently disavowed our plans? Existentialists harp on our freedom of choice; but what does this freedom mean to anyone who has had the experience of manipulating another person to get him to take as his own the choice one wants him to make? Yes, to reason from our comportment to contexts of objectivity to "the external reality of those objectivities" is dishonest. But why is this dishonesty a central issue, perhaps the central issue for me? Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre etc. commit themselves unreservedly to the transcendental argument to defend what to them is the responsible determination of reality (as opposed to the irresponsibility of the skeptic and solipsist). But by making this unreserved commitment in order to justify "the reality of the world," they commit themselves to this vulgar status quo—this inherited life-world—and especially to the unassailability of science and scientific technology. It is at exactly this juncture that they reveal themselves to be prisoners of their culture. It is here that they condemn themselves to submit to science's authority. If you need the reality of the world so badly that you will lie to get it—and what is a reality worth, which can only be established by a sophism?—then you will be unable to strike lethally at science. The reason why my invocation of "skepticism" is important is that I use "skepticism" as a solvent to dissolve the awesome status quo founded on scientific technology. Did the philosophers really suppose that there could be a serious challenge to the authority of science which would not initially seem mad and irresponsible? If we are to pass beyond scientific civilization without merely regressing and depriving ourselves, we must have the maneuverability which comes when we expose the contexts of objectivity as illusions. We must enter the zone which ranges from astute hypocrisy to radical unbelief and become proficient in the application of those orientations.

Further, if I say that society-directed morale is an illusion, that does not mean that I must never involve myself with it. I proclaim that the very "existence" of mathematics is an illusion; but I most definitely involve myself with that illusion, and thereby produce my most powerful counteragent to science to date. But I could not sabotage mathematics so effectively if I did not understand fully that the whole controversy is chimerical. Knowing where the illusions are enables you to potentiate your invocation of them. And we must understand where the illusions are in the
traditional personalistic subjectivities. Otherwise we will not be able to potentiate them to the level of powerful counteragents to scientific technology. To reiterate my caution, not to be interested in mathematics is a personalistic subjectivity, but mere lack of interest in mathematics on the part of masses of people has not in the least lessened the hegemony of mathematics in the culture.

I already made a preliminary critique of the personalistic subjectivities when I reviewed their traditional meanings and indicated that the imputation of contexts of objectivity (the past, the future, objective externalities, society, history) was inherent in those meanings. Let me now address some issues in a more discriminating critique. To begin with, what are the personalistic subjectivities in which I do not necessarily comport myself to contexts of objectivity? In preparation for my answer, I must note that in the European languages, we say that some of the affections I will mention "have objects." Annoyance has an object of annoyance; love has an object of love; attentiveness has an object of attention; etc. But we are not compelled to reify this idiom. "Having an object" need mean nothing more than that subjectivities of different types are "alongside" one another. It need not imply a claim that the "object" has an autonomous reality external to my experience. (Again, it is time that we forego the non sequitur in the transcendental argument.) Having said this, let me list some personalistic subjectivities which are least controversial for me: presence-of-mind; "not being all here"; dizziness; "the room is swimming"; liking; annoyance; relish; joy; serenity; love; perhaps attentiveness; perhaps involvement; perhaps indifference; self-consciousness; awareness of awareness; suspension of belief.

Turning to morale, I may call the notion of morale which I defined originally "proximate morale": feelings about whether my condition and the next actions possible for me are worthwhile. The state of "self-image" which I call self-satisfaction can then be a state of morale. But self-satisfaction is senseless except in relation to possible alternative actions which I forego. The analogue of self-satisfaction when choices are not at issue is serenity.

Turning to choice, when the transcendental dogma of freedom is ruled out, then the sense of choosing merges with the sense of acting willfully. And willfulness, passivity, and involuntariness should be mentioned in counterpoint with agitation, malaise, boredom, fidgeting, and longing. Attempting to probe these phenomena analytically (and thus verbally) is like attempting to probe my very involvement with language. As always, the question is as follows: what aspects of these phenomena are susceptible to skepticism, and are therefore matters of contingent fact? If I abruptly scratch the nape of my neck, I cannot any more characterize whether belief is involved in that action than I can make such a judgment about a cat which performs a similar action. Animals manifest what we construe as agitation, moodiness, fidgeting, frustration. It can be argued that the meaning of these moods lies in mentally fleeing the present, a feeling which is likely to eventuate in willful bodily movement. But animals cannot talk to us. Are manifestations of discomfort by animals accompanied by beliefs? We have reached the threshold where there aren't any plausibilities on which to base an exercise in astute hypocrisy.
Let us consider reducing willed action to liked action; and let us consider reducing strictly involuntary action to disliked change in the realm of one's mind and soma. "Passivity of the will" would then be reduced to indifference towards mental-somatic change. Also note that we carry on many actions, such as pacing and walking, while our attention is elsewhere. One has to have beliefs in order to find meaning in Anti-Mathematics. Does one have to have beliefs in order to pace the floor?

There may be readers who will be horrified that my skepticism and unfaith lead me to suspend such affections of the Ego as morale, self-image, choice, projecting, and even willing and perhaps longing. But these will be the readers who would acclaim me if I were to say that I was engaged in a mystical quest to transcend the Ego. Consider once again the analysis of the structures of the human condition in recent Western philosophy. Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre were not seriously trying to ascertain what is illusory or deluded in our condition. What they were actually interested in was expounding the prevailing norms of human life. We are supposed to carry our history, to struggle with our neighbors for an identity, to exert our will, to strive for success, to plan the future, to define ourselves by our fear of death. What Heidegger presented as the inherent structures of the human condition are just ingrained norms of personality (not the essence of the human condition but the essence of the culture's illusion). And I doubt these norms, not because I am self-defeating, but because I am already changing them—because I already am something other than a modern Western man. I want a clear-headed understanding of the degree to which the "obligatory" Ego is dispensable, because such an understanding will contribute to the recovery of our whole humanness and even to the overmastering of scientific technology (and to the start of a new form of life). Again, it is ironic that wariness of the Ego can only be made palatable by calling it mysticism. Only Eastern religion (with its anachronistic mythology and social purposes) is supposed to intervene in the core self, and to dabble at producing a person who cannot have a crisis of self-image or morale.

Actually, I have previously addressed issues of philosophical anthropology in print, and I already pursued the issues to the limits of language and relative plausibility. (See Blueprint for a Higher Civilization, pp. 21, 25, 27-9.) But I have a few more speculations on these matters now. Recent Western philosophy seizes on the counterposition of subject and object in consciousness, and makes it the starting point of the transcendental argument. But I must question whether, in a state of radical unbelief, the distinction between subject and object in consciousness will be necessary. The notion that there is a core self inside my perceptions which suffers my perceptions should perhaps be classified as an illusion itself. When I am functioning wordlessly, does not the distinction between core self and perceptions get lost?

Then, it could conceivably be argued that even some of the subjectivities which have gone uncriticized until now involve imputed objectivities. Nimbus-experience is typically comport to speech or musical performance, and thereby involves comportment to meaning. Relish and joy sometimes presuppose the stimulus of complex cultural artifacts or ideational content—although I do not concede that they necessarily do so. And finally, it could be argued that attentiveness and involvement, and even annoyance and liking, presuppose a contrast with absent mental states to be identifiable. However, this line of reasoning is becoming too clever by half—too reminiscent of Bradley's chapter on solipsism in Appearance and Reality. We should not play overly much on the circumstance that names are words: experience doesn't have to be a word.
4. Transitions Between Different States of Cognitive Morale

In the previous section, we found that skeptical detachment or suspension of belief can call morale into question, censuring it as an illusion. But in this section, we will find that morale can call skeptical detachment into question. There are states of consciousness in which skeptical detachment is impossible; and states of consciousness in which it is both difficult and unwanted. In the latter case, even a person who understands the uses of skeptical detachment—who knows illusion for what it is and has no loyalty to it—will nevertheless thrust aside skeptical detachment as tiresome and unimportant. The circumstance that an alteration in mood and morale can produce a change in cognitive attitude leads to the notion of "cognitive morale." Changes in one's state of cognitive morale manifest that personalistic subjectivities can interact with the determination of reality. They also manifest the interactions between co-present subjectivities of different types. To repeat an illustration I have already used, a visual-table-experience is quite a different matter if it is co-present with skeptical detachment, or if it is co-present with incapacity for skeptical detachment, or if it is co-present with "not being all here" (as in a fever) and cannot even be focused. I will investigate only one such interaction in detail in this section. But it is in the general area of interactions of this sort that the strongest consequences of personalistic subjectivities will be found.

In order to relate my observations to phenomena which are most familiar, let me begin with a state of consciousness in which skeptical detachment is absent not because it is unwanted but because it is impossible. Dreams typically unfold without the potentiality for skeptical detachment or suspension of belief. We can't detach ourselves from our imputations of corporeality to apparitions (unless there is a palpable violation of the standard natural order, as when I plunged through a solid surface without breaking it). An experience arrives with its context of objectivity, and recedes into the past without its context of objectivity ever being questioned. In our dreamed experiences, we are inescapably comported to a context of objectivity. That is why I keep saying that the proponents of the transcendental argument should proclaim that what we dream is the only real world, and that they should demand the abolition of waking life.

There is a qualification underlying this entire discussion which had better be spelled out and emphasized. Let me explain by citing the example of Christianity. Christianity has at times brought forth a literature in which adherents proclaim that they believe even though they know it isn't true. These authors evince an explicit disrespect for themselves: they knowingly avow anachronistic lies which have reactionary personal and political consequences. More recently, my own research has begun to evoke an exactly analogous response from scientists. One after another, scientists are telling me privately that they know that science is a hoax and is malicious, but that they are going to pursue it even so. Sometimes they tell me that the money is the deciding factor. Now although I speak of cognitive attitudes and the determination of reality as depending on morale, I certainly do not mean to encourage the mercenary, malicious avowal of elaborate systems of lies whose time has passed.
I am interested in situations in which the relation of morale to cognition runs so deep that it can withstand full disclosure, and has none of the willfulness and malice of a lie. To refer back to the case of dreaming, for example, dreaming is a state of consciousness in which (generally speaking) skeptical detachment is simply not available. There is no question of avowing lies; one simply cannot escape one's comportment to contexts of objectivity.

The state of consciousness which is of greatest interest in this regard is the psychedelic experience. The psychedelic experience may involve certain phenomena which constitute background to the transformation of cognitive morale. There are anomalous light phenomena. The zone of visual singular experience is amplified. At times there is a sense of not being all there, like fever without the debilitation. Intense mental visualisations, which may be involuntary, become possible. Intense daydreams, which may be involuntary, become possible. One's mood becomes hyper-suggestible: one loses all forbearance for annoyances; and the suggestive power of music is greatly intensified.

The experience encourages feelings of love, by causing you to disregard conflicts which you have with the beloved while "straight." (Here as elsewhere, it is difficult to choose either the psychedelic perspective or the straight perspective over the other as being the truth.) Finally, certain definite, localized experiences become available which are immensely valuable and which are almost unavailable elsewhere: sublime relish; nimbus-experience. In the state of consciousness in which the above phenomena are available, morale is also profoundly affected, even at moments when the desired anomalous phenomena are not occurring, and one is jittery and impatient. What happens is that the interest in theory, and in oral or written reporting, gets lost. When one is jittery and bored, there is nothing to report; and when something valuable is happening one doesn't want to interrupt and dilute it by oral or written reporting. And since one loses one's forbearance, one has no interest in struggling to communicate with dullards. (In this one respect, belief diminishes, since society-directed morale and Ego-identity are lost.) At the same time, one does comport oneself to contexts of objectivity, particularly in regard to some of the anomalous experiences already mentioned. One has no interest and possibly no ability for skeptically dissociating, for suspending the beliefs involved.

Again, I must emphasize that the alternation of cognitive morale is direct and profound: it can withstand full disclosure. There is no question of defiantly and maliciously avowing a lie, or of willfully protecting one's illusions. Nor is there a question of the type of imputation of meaning that occurs when you read a detective story. Indeed, you don't want to read anything. For me, the ultimate meaning of the psychedelic experience is that partly because the sublime relish and nimbus-experiences which become available are so valuable, scientific or theoretical thought, stable object-gestalts, and nihilative empiricist self-consciousness all get lost or are occluded.
But it would be terribly naive to conclude that the raw psychedelic experience can be a decisive counteragent to the scientific outlook. On the contrary, the experience actually dispels any interest in combating science intellectually, and it also dispels any interest in the skeptical detachment or nihilative empiricism which for me is the most compelling way out of the awesome reality of science. There are science students who have taken psychedelics; and when the influence wears off, their morale as scientists is hardy enough that they simply decide that they do not want to take psychedelics again. The psychedelic transformation of the perceptual world, of mood, of the ability to daydream, of the will, and of morale becomes a challenge to science and mathematics only for those who passionately seek the challenge. To repeat, it remains an unsolved problem as to how the psychedelic experience should be potentiated in the meta-technology. The experience actually dispels one's ability to criticize science intellectually; and if it is to intensify one's wariness of science in other respects, those respects require a lot of elucidation.