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Pollidai?

Destryying the Perceptual Mechanism

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WOODY: Joh was asking me the question what I mean by my "I'm just trying to destroy the perceptual mechanism as the only possiblity of perceiving "reality." Polidori brought me to a certain kind of objection. . . Lo you remember what objection?

ROBERT: Yes, it would be exactly the opposite of what you say here. It would be how "I'm trying to destroy the perceptual mechanism as the only possibility of perceiving "reality" . . . I's saying it is the only possibility. If you don't have that, how can you do it?

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WOODY: I have in a way been objecting. As long as we're going to look at the surface only as an quality of image, then we will be bound to discuss the qualities of that surface, which of course are very amibuous to define. What I was trying to say is that, for me at least, there is a possibility to understand the principles of organization behind the surface of the image and elect that as an esthetic principle. So I have the privilege to commute between the surface, which may be the only way to perceive unspecifiable elements like mood, emotions,/feelings . . . and I have also the privilege to commute from that one _____, into the different logic sphere--not rational-in which I suddenly could also realize the process. Because I object to be confined into the perceptional, surface-perception -- surface perception only-and that was probably the wish I had projected. Because I do helieve that esthetic appreciation can be also beyond the perceptional one, and then the inner architecture of a particular event, even if it's dynamic, takes precedent over the perception of the

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surface.

woody: But then I can object and say since this rule has been established as a status quo, then there is so much escaping to the new audience from electronic imaging. Because people just look at it immediately the way you say: if it's not/perceptually image obvious, there's no reason even to try to look beyond that. So if you make it into perceptual imperialism/?/, then there's no hope that we can ever encode additional messages beyond what the surface says. Of course, that may be the first demand clarity may be the first demand, but more I'm wiwa/interested in these other thingsx beyond the simplicity of superficial image understanding.

JON: One of the problems with this is that you're speaking in a tautology of perceiving. The perceptual mechanism is perceiving. X You make do not mean perceiving, but conceptualizing, rationalizing, categorizing. These are higher level functions.

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I mean this WOODY: Being more specific, /in the sens of traditional syntax going through a vocabulary such as/fade-in of the image or a dissolve between two images which has been celebrated topically in cinematic estheticsX. Ixkxxx I have found out-much-more what are to me what are not only more interesting or more powerful transitions in electronic imaging, but more poetic substances. In the substance of appreciation of such an effect which I calla kind of contributionnew syntactic expression, I've found these aspects of electronic imaging am extremely pwoerful and persuasive sources of poetic appreciation. But laoking at the image and decoding it on this perceptional level . . . that's when it becomes challenging. When the electronic transition or syntax become extremely relevant to the recognition of the perceptional event or mechanism of decoding, I think that's where the point is. Where the electronic processing is very close to/perceptional decoding. I think these two systems, the human and the electronic, recognize the point in which the m latter is very close to human perceptional decoding so that you, as maker or viewer, don't even have to rationalize it. At least that is my personal mythology. I believe there's a meeting of two great qualities regardless of our slavish contemporary ego, our traditional sense of image recognitionn. I might even say there's a conspiracy within us which is much greater than we understand.

ROBERT: Right, but I think that's because if you're working on it yourself you've already established a certain set of terms of what things mean. You've worked our your operant vocabulary. So, in a sense you're your own audience and you already know, but to communicate it to another person you have to put it out in a certain way to that they can input into your rationale.

JON: What's the purpose of looking at the oerganizational princples?

WOODY: I would say that it depends on what we name as the content. I am XXXXX saying that our product, our composite "works" XXXXX saying that our product, our composite "works" XXXXX maybe should only indicate certain new structures and XXXX maybe should not utilize the structure to attach other meanings to it. That means materiality and mythification. But we can also speculate about the material. beyond The material does not bind/the primary level. You can take a m-aterial and use it in a highly speculative way. And, as politdori says, we can even use it to negotiate our relationship to the audience. In that case, we have to tell the audience in some direct way what we're doing. But these are assumed obligations--XXXX of course, we don't have to. We can violate this or simply disregard this.

JON: There's this constant reference to the product now, and I think to deal specifically with the product puts a set of considerations that are important but are not precisely wha we're takking about right now. I think it is important now

to talk about the process of exam ining and amalyzing and understanding these organization princples and organizational and prescript principles materials both in the hardware itself and in the procedures/ we may bring to it.

WOODY: Okay. So let's continue what you've been suggesting because I happen to agree at this particular time that just to identify those elements and just to learn how tocontrol them takes precedt nover any other speculation or any speculative possibility. Let's say if you go into composition you already do speculate . . . in fact, negotiate the whole context of the culture. But if you're on this particular level in which you try to identify each component and use it . . . not necessarily use it . . . even just foreseeing its use . . . not even indicating the use, just trying to put it into some hierarchic order. That, for example, for me , is totally enough. I am busied by it, baffled by it. I would still call it a creative process. In a way I would never exclude it from the process of creation or the process of art, yet the attention that I pay services other people on a different level. It shares in fact this first responsibility of understanding those elements which I have elected t as xhm/content of my work.

JON: This eigene exemperate exemp

light. With ITalian painting of the 16th century it was perspective, which is indicative of a whole new way of perceiving relaity. I was reading Alberti this morning, and he says "Iwill speak of the mathematicians what the mathematicians have to say " which deals with linearityand geometry, and "I give to the painters what thexchare toxsxxxc is their's, which is a more sensate wisdom" /find precise quote/ Both of these areas were shared. So that there is frequently some kind of analytical framework ax having to do withthe materials. or with the visualization -- the world out there--and it's often a fundamental way questions are posed in art. What seems to distinguish it here is that we're dealing with tools that are technologically based and we are not im engineers just as the renaissance painters were not mathematicians. Andxxixm What's more, these tools present to us certain paradigms, certain microcosms of interaction that don't exist for the painter or the sculptor. So we're c fronted with a set of questions to examine these mechanisms, to find some kind of systematic methodology for relating it in some general way to our view, or what may beome, our view of the world. And then we're confronted with this really sticky and awful problem which is the human perceptual mechanism. We extist in a tim in which psychology has only very recently become--how to say--precise. It's only been sixty years that psycholgy

has had any kind of intricate meaning, any kind of genuine analytical function. So we're here in a time which, in dealing with all these systems, we also have to deal with our own. We have to say not only that there's that system which technologically mediates my encoding of "reality"; but also that there's this system here which I look through, I imagine from it, I take ideas through it and what are these inherent properties of my perception and cognition? Both function in ways which sometimes seem ma analogous and both are, in their turn, as much a part of the visualization of "reality" as the other. And so we have this double layer. And this also has many modalities in quantum theory which is interesting also. It's an interesting historical connexion that a double level of experimental equipment was bourght into psychology at almost the precisely the same time in psychology as an analytical physics. The atomic physicists were in the position of having to say "Well, there is this subatomic world and I'll deal with one mxperimental and philosophical model there, but at the same time I must keep most of my experiments in wixxxixxi the framework of classical mechanics. That I myst assume that thix there is an inherent double level to the complete renditionof reality and that I have to operate within an experimental model which is both closed and open at the same time." So they were confronted with a strangtycanzingauxzarabien problem strongly analogous to ours. In a modal sense, it's precisely

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the same problem. So there are all these aspects that work various into it, that in xame waysare of immense concern to us. WOODY: I would put it this way. The more the external systems $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}^{V}} \in \mathcal{L} \quad \text{\mathbb{T}°}$ develop, the more we become linking them to our own perceptional events. The vidicon behaves mery much as certain ENPOYME events on the retina, so that seems to us to be modelling our thoughts towards that as a possibility of somehow understanding the perceptional events. Fur ther, if you go into the computer it also seems to be challenging enging this
HIE WHOLE (ON(EM) OF neural biological structure of nervous system or even processing Rowald of information. So I don't think we are really in command of those processes, we are just in a time in which those other processes, those technologocal ones, seem to be very much relevant to our way of interpretation of those mysteries which we could have never thought about before they existed. So again, the priority. What we are talking about is if man's ability to interpret the world is primary, or his dependency help in him to progress. So this bondage toward technology is totally obvious. But the interpretation of it differs. Some people feel it's infringing on their evolutionary ideas. JON: This brings us back to what we started the session with, with alternate modes of percetion or modes of realization what have-nothing-t are outside our presently constituted accustomes perception. And what seems thexeiven to be given

not only in scientific research, but in alm ost everythin we do is that mx aspect that as you look deeper and deeper and wider and wider, there has to be an absolute consistency in basic parameters of "how things work." And also, the bondage that we feel in technology is that ability to experience realms of which we otherwise would have no experience or a radically different experience. Wexweetdxstiltxthinkxthat thezmuirerxex If we did not have telescopes, we would still think the universe is a crystal sphere with lanterns imbedded in it. Now we are confronted with major challenges to thought that exist on the very small level, the subatomic level, because our instruments have shown to us paradigms that question the consistancy of all the assumptions we previously held. And so here we are, confronted with this; that everywhere we look our assimptions are challenged. All of a sudden we have to ask ourselves whether there are other modes for which you can completely account for various aspects of our experience in ways different from "normal" and whether that EXEXX very basic assumption of the/consistency of a single model can really be supported. We have these various modalities of rationalozing, of understanding, which in a sense have only a relative aspect to them-that each works only within its own territory. We use xxi classical dynamics to deal with celestial mechanics and we use quantum theory--satisfactory or unsatisfactory as it

is--to deal with subatomic physics. That htere is in fact no single answer, no single comprehension. So we're confronted with this ambivalent paradigm, and with this knowledge and understanding, we are confronting other areas of understanding for ourselves in more personal way than experimental methods. It makes us ask about the veracity of our accustomed modes of understanding, and whither there are other ones as viable as those we've come to accept?

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WOODY: So then, let me ask you this question. What you say brings me this particular image. That we are surrounded by a certain complexity in which/more we look at it, the more we see of it. But we are not proportionally able to develop theories or methodologies to understand it. We are continuously re-learning or restructuring our methodologies, our vocabularies) In fact the knowledge is available at such a magnitude that we cannot even process it in a certain human sense, to that's how the specialized branches thrive. But of course there's no communication to a general set of humanistic code or human codes of exchange. That's why we found these principles continuously amazing and new and surprising. Another way you put it, in the tradition of art as if art could have answered a lot of questions in the past up to modern art, which would continuously examine those other areas, and in fact developed

certain styles and methods to understand them. But it seems to be disproportionate now. Arta s we know it cannot any more answer so many questions because it may not even be a function of art. Art has the theory that it always EXEXXEDEEX overcomes all the obstacles of understanding, will live forever. It has eternality, which is the closest comceptual relation in which God is omnipresent, omnipotent and all, which cuts across the bound of time and energy totally. So that; s a priori said, that's the way it is and art comes the closest of a discipline I can redall to the perfect model. And it seemed to be always working. Because after all, people always elect certain eras and masterpieces to represent this absolute model and even if it's dynamic it accomodates that need. So I guess it is the continuous rivalry between the religious and art kinx concepts to accomodate the need, or permanent quality, or ideal model of beauty.

JON: What do you think of the absolute inhumanity of the kinds of approaches we are practicing?

WOODY:-It's-transitory-because-there-are-periods-in-which-...
What do you call humanity? Is i- a certain quality a priori
that lays within, which says human kind is positive?

JON: I think it has been violated so many times by various
crusades or various political movements or nationalisms,
or racism. These tings have been questioned probably since
the beginning . . . there's no true quality in anything we